understandable, it is, I think, ultimately misguided: an ethically defensible arms trade is possible.
The first step in my argument for this claim is to note that all persons have a right to security, or, perhaps more accurately, that all persons have a cluster of security rights: rights not to be assaulted, tortured, raped, killed, and so forth. In short, all persons have a right to physical safety. 8 As Henry Shue has observed, no one would be willing to deny that all persons possess this minimal right. 9 The right to security generates a variety of correlative duties. For now, notice that it puts states under a duty to protect the security of their citizens. The next important step in the argument is to point out that, in order to discharge this duty, states need weapons (or at least that in all realistically imaginable scenarios they need weapons). Without weapons, states would be unable to protect their citizens from armed aggressors (armed criminals, terrorist groups, belligerent regimes, etc.). Weapons enable states to both deter and repel such threats, and thus to protect their citizens' security.
It might be said that, in theory, states could protect their citizens' right to security not by acquiring weapons with which to deter and repel armed aggressors, but rather by bringing about the worldwide abolition of weapons. There are multiple reasons for dismissing this claim. First, and most obviously, bringing about the worldwide abolition of weapons is not an option that is 4 realistically available to states. Second, even if states agreed to mutual disarmament there would always be the very real possibility that certain states would secretly retain their arsenals. And, third, even if mutual disarmament was achieved at time T, there would always be the very real possibility that certain states would (perhaps secretly) rearm at time T + n. When a state disarms, it leaves itself and its citizens vulnerable, even if other states have also agreed to disarm. Now, some states lack the capacity to produce their own weapons, or at least to produce weapons of adequate quality and in sufficient quantities. Consequently, in order to acquire weapons of adequate quality and in sufficient quantities, and to discharge their duty to protect the safety of their citizens, such states must import weapons from abroad. If these states were unable to import weapons -if no international trade in weapons was permitted -they would not be able to ensure the security of their citizens. Blocking all international arms transfers would penalize states which lack the capacity to produce their own weapons, and unjustifiably jeopardize the security of the people who live in those states. 10 The argument presented in the previous paragraph establishes that international trade in (at least certain kinds of) weapons can be morally permissible when it consists in transfers to states which lack the capacity to produce weapons (of adequate quality and in sufficient quantities), and which import weapons in order to discharge their duty to protect their citizens' security. But a great many international arms transfers are not of this kind. For most of the 20 th Century, the largest arms exporters mainly sold weapons to other economically developed countries 11 , most of which, by virtue of being economically developed, presumably either possessed or could acquire the capacity to produce weapons of adequate quality and in sufficient quantities. The argument presented above does not explicitly vindicate these kinds of transfers, but it does provide the resources needed to do so. It establishes that weapons have a legitimate function, viz. they enable states to discharge their duty to protect the security of their citizens.
And if weapons have a legitimate function, it is hard to see why trade in weapons would only be 5 morally permissible when it consists in transfers to states which lack the capacity to produce weapons of their own. If a state possesses the capacity to produce its own weapons, but has a comparative disadvantage in weapons manufacturing, it makes sense for that state to purchase weapons from abroad and to devote the resources it would have otherwise used to manufacture weapons to alternative lines of production. If weapons have a legitimate function, then it is at least prima facie acceptable for a state to produce weapons, and if it is acceptable for a state to produce weapons, it is acceptable for a state to eschew weapons production and purchase weapons from abroad, which a state has a good reason to do when it lacks a comparative advantage in weapons production.
The arms trade, then, can be justified by appeal to the right to security. 12 States are permitted to purchase weapons either because doing so is (i) necessary to protect their citizens' security, or (ii) the most efficient way of protecting their citizens' security. And in order for a state to be able to purchase weapons, others must be permitted to sell weapons. (A state is able to purchase weapons provided that there is at least one supplier, and irrespective of whether private firms are permitted to sell weapons in addition to state-owned firms, but the advantages associated with allowing multiple suppliers to compete in a market at least ground a presumption against denying firms permission to offer their services.) 13 So far, I have defended the moral permissibility of (a form of) the arms trade by appealing to the value of security. But that same value can be used to identify moral limits to the arms trade. More specifically, the value of security can be used to discern limits on the range of weapon-types which may permissibly be traded, and on the range of appropriate recipients of arms transfers. There is much to say about the latter issue, but, first, let us briefly address the former. All weapons are designed to incapacitate, injure, or kill, and so all weapons pose a threat to individuals' physical safety. But some weapons pose an unacceptably large threat to individuals who have not made themselves liable to attack, and who are thus not permissible targets.
Paradigmatic examples of such weapons include land mines and nerve gas, both of which kill and maim indiscriminately. These weapons pose a threat which is either spatially-or temporallyextended to an unusual and excessive degree. Nerve gas generates harms which are highly diffuse; it can travel large distances and kill non-combatants far from the battlefield. The threat posed by landmines has a shorter range, but extends far into the future: people continue to be killed and dismembered by unexploded mines long after hostilities have ceased. Ammunition containing depleted uranium, which was used extensively by British and US forces in Iraq and the Balkans, also potentially falls into this category. Upon impact, depleted uranium shells release radioactive particles which are potentially cancer-causing, persist in the environment for decades, and can travel far from the site where they were originally released.
14 It is not my intention to discuss this issue in any depth, for the primary question regarding weapons in this category is whether it is ever permissible to use such weapons, and thus whether they should be manufactured in the first place. But, given that these weapons exist, and that states possess them, it is worth at least acknowledging that if their use is impermissible, their sale is too. If, for agent-neutral reasons, it is impermissible to use a particular item, it is also impermissible to enable, and benefit from enabling, the use of that item by others.
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Let us now consider limits imposed by the right to security on the range of appropriate recipients of arms transfers. I noted earlier that the right to security imposes upon states a duty to protect the security of their own citizens. In addition to this duty, the right to security puts states under a duty to refrain from depriving any person, wherever she resides, of the substance of that right. While it is clear that duties generated by the right to security are violated by regimes which kill and injure innocent members of their own citizenry, or aggress against foreign countries, I submit that those duties are also violated by states which provide arms to regimes which kill and injure their own citizens or aggress against foreign countries. When a state arms such regimes it facilitates, and thus becomes complicit in, those regimes' crimes. States are therefore morally required to refrain from arming such regimes. 19 In the following two sections, I
hope to vindicate this claim. The proposition is, I think, intuitive enough, but it is vulnerable to a number of objections. I will focus on defending the claim that states must refrain from selling (and must prevent their citizens from selling) weapons to regimes which oppress their own citizens, but most of what I say also applies to states which aggress against other countries.
II.
The claim that states must refrain from arming oppressive regimes can be resisted in the following manner. One might argue that the duties generated by the right to security sometimes conflict, in the sense that situations sometimes arise in which a state must choose between 8 discharging its security-related duties to its own citizens and discharging its security-related duties to citizens of other states. In such cases, the argument claims, states may permissibly opt to discharge their duties to their own citizens, at the expense of the fulfilment of their duties to the citizens of other states. Or, put more modestly, states may permissibly opt to discharge certain duties to their own citizens, at the expense of the fulfilment of certain duties to the citizens of 'significant' abuses were committed by the government or state security forces in more than half of these twenty-five countries. 20 It is tempting to reply to the claim that sates have a duty to arm oppressive regimes when, by doing so, they can enhance the security of their own citizens by arguing as follows: a state's duty to enhance the security of its own citizens is a positive duty, whereas a state's duty to refrain from undermining the security of others is a negative duty, and that, other things being equal, honouring negative duties takes priority over discharging positive duties. This strategy has two weaknesses. First, some people will deny that the distinction between positive and negative duties carries much (if any) weight. And, second, it is not obvious that a state's duty to enhance the security of its citizens is best conceived of as a positive duty. One might maintain that there is a negative duty not to assume a particular role and then fail to perform the functions associated with that role 21 , that providing security is a primary function of the state, and that state officials therefore violate a negative duty when they decline to take measures necessary to enhance the security of their citizens. Given these weaknesses, I will criticize the claim that states must arm oppressive regimes when doing so conduces to their citizens' security without appealing to the distinction between positive and negative duties. I will identify four problems which the claim faces.
The first problem the argument encounters concerns its empirical claim that states can enhance the security of their citizens -and, more specifically, reduce the threat they face from terrorism -by arming certain oppressive regimes. In a recent discussion of trade-offs between security and liberty, Jeremy Waldron argues that those who recommend curtailing civil liberties in order to reduce the threat to security posed by terrorist organizations must show that the curtailments they propose will actually have a positive impact upon security. 22 An analogous argument applies here. Those who advocate arming oppressive regimes on the grounds that doing so will enhance domestic security must be able to convincingly demonstrate that the security gains they envisage will actually be forthcoming. They must, in particular, be able to counter the common claim that arming a regime which a terrorist group opposes will actually increase that group's hostility towards us, swell its ranks, and strengthen its resolve. This will not be easy.
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A second problem concerns the argument's normative claim that states have a duty to arm oppressive regimes when doing so enhances the security of their citizens. This claim is problematic because the right to security is not plausibly conceived of as a right to be maximally secure. This is not just because, specified in such a way, the right to security could not be adequately reconciled with other rights (such as the right to privacy), or because, specified in such a way, it would generate duties which are, in an absolute sense, overly demanding. It is also because the interest in being maximally, as opposed to reasonably, secure is just not weighty enough to place others under a duty. To illustrate this point, consider the duties imposed upon a mother by her child's right to security. The mother may be able to enhance her child's security by hiring a guard to patrol the perimeter of their house; hiring a security guard might reduce the probability that a dangerous intruder will break in and pose a threat to the child. Moreover, hiring a security guard might not be financially burdensome (suppose the mother is quite wealthy), and we can stipulate that hiring a security guard would not violate anyone's rights (or wrong anyone in any other way). Still, provided that the probability of a house invasion is already low -suppose the mother and child live in a reasonably safe neighbourhood, and other reasonable security precautions are taken (an intruder alarm has been installed, doors and windows are locked at night, etc.) -it just does not seem plausible to claim that the child's right imposes upon her mother a duty to hire a security guard. By hiring a security guard the mother goes beyond the call of duty; she provides her child with more than the adequate degree of security to which her child is entitled. The upshot of these considerations is this: in order to show that the right to security imposes upon states a duty to transfer arms to oppressive regimes it is not sufficient to show that such transfers will have a positive impact on security; rather, what must be shown is that arming oppressive regimes will ensure that people enjoy the adequate degree of security that the right to security is a right to.
Suppose that the previous two problems can be surmounted. Suppose we have good reason to think that by arming oppressive regimes a state can increase, and not diminish, the amount of security enjoyed by its citizens, and that that extra security is owed as a matter of right. A third problem is that, in order to vindicate the provision of weapons to oppressive regimes, it must be shown that there are not acceptable alternative methods for generating the extra security which such provision offers. If a state has the means to provide the security to which its citizens are owed without arming oppressive regimes, advocates of the latter strategy must explain why those alternative means are unacceptable. 23 The final problem is also the most serious. Suppose that our interest in a certain quantity of security is sufficiently weighty to impose upon our state a duty to provide us with that quantity of security. Suppose, too, that our state can only provide that quantity of security by supplying weapons to an oppressive regime. Even if these conditions hold, it does not follow that our state is under a duty to supply the weapons. This becomes clear when we notice that the duty which our interest in a particular quantity of security imposes upon our state has not yet been adequately specified. This duty is not plausibly conceived of as a duty to provide the relevant quantity of security whatever it takes, but rather as a duty to provide that quantity of security if and when it can be provided through morally permissible means.
Consider an analogy. Suppose I am expected to attend a close friend's wedding, and that, on the way to the ceremony, I get caught in a traffic jam. As a result of the delay I can only get to the wedding on time by driving at dangerously high speeds and running red lights. Clearly I am not permitted to drive at dangerously high speeds and run red lights. The set of options morally available to me is not expanded by the fact that the normal option-set is too restrictive to enable me to get to the wedding on time. Moreover, provided that I allowed myself a reasonable amount of time to travel to the wedding, and that the traffic jam could not have reasonably been
foreseen, I think we should deny that by arriving late to the wedding I have violated a duty to my Now, it might be objected that, in the case I described, driving dangerously fast and running red lights is impermissible because the harms it inflicts (including risks) are disproportionate to the harms I was trying to avoid (the disappointment my friend would feel if I missed his wedding). But, it might be argued, dangerous driving would be permissible in a case in which the harms (including risks) it inflicts were proportional to the harms the driver sought to prevent. Suppose there is a man in my car who will die unless he receives immediate medical attention. In such a scenario, it seems that I would be morally permitted to drive in a manner which imposes upon other motorists and pedestrians a degree of risk that is higher than that which could permissibly be imposed in less exceptional circumstances. Analogously, it might be argued, it is permissible for a state to inflict the harms associated with arming an oppressive regime when those harms are proportional to the expected harms it seeks to prevent befalling its own citizens, and the harms the US inflicts, or contributes to inflicting, when it arms oppressive 13 regimes are proportional to the expected harms it seeks to prevent -namely, the harms which its citizens would suffer if they fell victim to a terrorist attack.
I do not find this argument convincing. I agree that it is permissible to drive in certain ways which would otherwise be impermissible if one is trying to get a dying man to a hospital, but considerations about proportionality do not do all of the work in grounding this judgement.
In order for one's dangerous driving in such a scenario to be permissible it must be the case that the harms (including risks) which one inflicts are limited in size. Even in such exceptional circumstances, one is not permitted to drive with complete disregard for the safety of other motorists and pedestrians: one must still drive with an adequate degree of due care and attention.
The point can be brought more sharply into focus with a further example. Consider a child who will die unless she receives a heart transplant. If the child's mother kills someone in order to give that person's heart to her child, the harms she inflicts are proportional to the harms she aims to prevent. But no one would think it anything but obvious that the mother acts impermissibly.
The thought underlying this conviction is that, except perhaps in the most exceptional of circumstances, it is simply impermissible to inflict certain, serious, harms upon innocent individuals, even if, by inflicting such harms, one could prevent comparable harms from befalling others. Do the harms generated by weapons transfers to oppressive regimes fall into this category? I think that, at least in certain (not unrepresentative) cases, our answer to this question must be affirmative. One country which received large quantities of US weapons in the aftermath of 9/11 is Uzbekistan, a country presided over by an authoritarian regime which is regularly accused of serious human rights abuses. 24 Here is a short excerpt from the US State Department's 2006 Human Rights Report for that country.
The government's human rights record, already poor, continued to worsen during the year.
Citizens did not have the right in practice to change their government through peaceful and democratic means. Security forces routinely tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated detainees under interrogation to obtain confessions or incriminating information. In several cases, authorities subjected human rights activists and other critics of the regime to forced psychiatric treatment. Human rights activists and journalists who criticized the government were subject to harassment, arbitrary arrest, politically motivated prosecution, and physical attack. The government generally did not take steps to investigate or punish the most egregious cases of abuse… The government continued to refuse to authorize an independent international investigation of the alleged killing of numerous unarmed civilians during the violent disturbances of May 2005. 25 Elaborating, the report notes that 'torture and abuse were systematic', and that methods used by security forces included 'suffocation, electric shock, deprivation of food and water, and sexual abuse…' Security forces were accused of abusing human rights activists by 'dropping them onto concrete floors, forcing needles under their fingernails, suffocating them with gas masks, and burning their skin with lighted cigarettes'.
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It is hard to imagine anyone denying that these are serious harms. Moreover, weapons transfers contribute to these serious harms in at least four ways: first, they provide tools with which security forces coerce, maim, and kill; second, they increase the power of the state relative to internal dissident groups; third, they increase the power of the state relative to members of the international community which may wish to intervene to protect basic rights; fourth, arms transfers constitute a form of international cooperation, and thus demonstrate that such cooperation is not contingent upon respect for basic rights: they counteract any verbal exhortations made by the exporting state, and reveal that opportunities for cooperation will be forthcoming irrespective of whether basic rights are respected.
With these considerations in mind I resubmit my original claim: states are morally required to refrain from selling weapons to oppressive regimes. When states provide arms to oppressive regimes such as the one in power in Uzbekistan they enhance and sustain grave threats to the security of the individuals who are subject to the power of those regimes, and thereby contribute to the infliction of serious harms which may not permissibly be inflicted.
III.
In this section I consider two further objections which can be pressed against the claim just propounded, namely, that states must refrain from selling weapons to oppressive regimes. First, it might be argued that arms sales to oppressive regimes can pave the way to improvements in the human rights practices of those regimes. When a state transfers weapons to an oppressive regime, it can win favour with that regime, and request that it reciprocate in certain ways, e.g. by being more respectful of human rights. I do not think that anyone willing to think objectively about these matters will take this argument very seriously. It might be true that, under certain circumstances, certain oppressive regimes will be willing to do certain things in return for weapons, especially if those weapons are provided at a discounted price. But there are a wide variety of incentives which states can offer in an attempt to influence the behaviour of oppressive regimes, and common sense indicates that weapons -tools which increase the ease with which oppressive regimes can violate the rights of their subjects -are among the least appropriate of those incentives.
A second argument runs as follows. Given that oppressive regimes will inevitably acquire weapons from somewhere, they may as well acquire them from us (i.e. liberal democratic states).
Indeed, the argument continues, an oppressive regime purchasing arms from us is preferable to an oppressive regime purchasing weapons from another oppressive or illiberal regime. The largest five arms exporters are Britain, France, the US, Russia, and China
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, and, according to the current argument, it would be better for an oppressive regime like Uzbekistan to enter into an arms agreement with one of the three relatively liberal democracies on that list than to enter into an arms agreement with Russia or China. This is for a variety of reasons. First, as we have just noted, arms exporters may be able to exert some degree of influence over their trading partners, 16 and it would be better for an oppressive regime to be influenced by a liberal democracy than by another oppressive or illiberal regime. Second, the revenues Russia and China derive from arms sales to oppressive regimes will be used, inter alia, to augment their own arsenals. If we are concerned to minimize the quantities of weapons acquired by oppressive and illiberal regimes (and minimization is the only realistically achievable goal), we should do our best to deny such regimes access to the funds needed to buy and produce weapons, even if that means stealing their would-be trading partners in the international arms market -which may well be other oppressive regimes. Third, successful sales boost the profits of our arms industry, irrespective of who those sales are to, and our arms industry can invest those profits back into production of weapons systems for use by our own armed forces, and thereby enhance our security.
One way to respond to this argument is to reject its consequentialist reasoning, but it can also be challenged on its own consequentialist terms. Three points should be acknowledged.
First, states will buy weapons from the firm which offers them the best deal. When firms compete for a particular customer they will often drive down their prices in order to match those offered by their counterparts. By permitting our firms to offer weapons to an oppressive regime, we increase the competitiveness of that particular market, and thereby enable the regime in question to acquire weapons at a lower price, and thus a larger quantity of weapons, than it would otherwise have been able to acquire. (One weakness of this argument is that, if we permitted our firms to drive down prices, we would also reduce the income which oppressive states may derive from arms sales.) Second, we may possess certain types of weapons, or weapons of a particularly high quality, which other potential suppliers lack. This is certainly true of the US. Thus, by transferring arms to an oppressive regime the US enables it to become more effective at oppressing its subjects than it would otherwise have been. Third, by trading arms with an oppressive regime we forego any possibility of persuading third parties to refrain from engaging in such trade. If we demonstrate a willingness to surrender the benefits of trading with certain oppressive regimes, we may have a chance of convincing others to surrender those benefits too. The moment we provide weapons, that chance vanishes. 28 Relatedly, at our disposal are a variety of coercive economic measures which may be used against those who trade arms with particular oppressive regimes. But clearly we could not employ such measures if we were also trading with those regimes.
The two objections considered in this section fail. Selling weapons to oppressive regimes cannot be defended on the grounds that doing so may lead to improvements in the human rights practices of those regimes, or on the grounds that oppressive regimes will inevitably be able to acquire weapons from some source or other. Therefore, my initial claim stands: states are morally required to refrain from selling weapons to oppressive regimes.
IV.
In the previous two sections I argued that in order to respect the right to security possessed by individuals subject to the power of oppressive regimes, states must refrain from providing arms to such regimes. In this section I consider the moral permissibility of transferring arms to rebel groups waging revolutionary war against oppressive regimes. A concern for the security rights of those ruled by oppressive regimes gives us a prima facie reason to welcome the overthrow of those regimes, and to support the groups attempting to overthrow them. But that same concern also casts doubt on the strategy of supporting those groups by arming them.
Before I proceed, one clarification should be made. In what follows, I do not distinguish between trading and the broader notion of transferring. States often simply give, rather than sell, weapons to rebel groups, and if one thinks there is sometimes a moral duty to supply weapons to rebel groups that duty is surely best conceived of as a duty to give weapons free of charge, rather than as a duty to supply weapons in some way, including via the market. But, for present purposes, the distinction between trading and transferring is not germane. The issues I raise 18 concern the provision of weapons to rebel groups per se, not the manner of that provision, and I will tend to speak simply of 'arming' rebel groups.
Given that arming is one form of supporting, determining (a) if and when it is permissible to arm rebel groups involves (b) determining if and when it is permissible to support rebel groups in some way. My intention is to focus on the distinctive issues which arise in relation to the former concern, but one general point about supporting rebel groups needs to be made first. If supporting a rebel group is to be permissible, it seems clear that several conditions, adapted from traditional just war theory, must be satisfied: the rebel group must have a just cause -the aim of the group cannot be to overthrow one oppressive regime and replace it with another; the harms which will occur if the rebels, with outside assistance, continue to fight must be proportional to the harms which the war effort can be expected to prevent; the war must be necessary -alternative means of overthrowing the regime must be unavailable; and it must be reasonable to expect that the rebel group, at least if it receives outside help, will not deliberately inflict violence upon non-combatants. These conditions will be relevant in what follows.
Arming a rebel group might be impermissible even if supporting it in other ways is not. Why are these considerations morally salient? It was noted earlier that certain conditions must be met if support for a rebel group is to be permissible. The important point to acknowledge now is that those conditions, or at least some of those conditions, might obtain one day, but not the next. For example, at time T it might be reasonable to believe that the rebel group one is contemplating supporting will not deliberately inflict violence upon noncombatants, but at time T + n it might became painfully clear that that belief was unfounded. A rebel group which had hitherto behaved in a morally appropriate manner might suddenly start engaging in attacks on civilians. Such a scenario is not at all improbable. As Allen Buchanan has recently explained, rebel groups often face strong pressures to engage in immoral conduct, and those pressures can intensify over time. This can happen if, for example, the regime the rebels are trying to overthrow attempts to dissuade people from participating in the revolution by increasing the penalties it imposes on those who engage in revolutionary activity. When a regime does this, rebels have a strong incentive to impose penalties on those who do not take part in the revolution: doing so may be their only way of maintaining participation at adequate levels. 29 provision of arms, for that strategy is often perceived to be superior to more direct forms of military intervention which tend to be eschewed when possible on the grounds that they put troops in harm's way, upset the electorate, and are extremely expensive. The US has recently supplied weapons to rebel forces in Syria but has resisted calls for other types of action. The upshot of the considerations adduced here is that providing arms should not be regarded as an unproblematic way of assisting rebel groups which is necessarily preferable to other available methods. By transferring weapons to a rebel group states provide that group with the means to violate the security rights of their fellow countrymen and countrywomen. Provided that the war the rebels are waging meets the criteria adumbrated above, a state supplying weapons does not violate negative duties generated by the right to security. But it must acknowledge the risks associated with arming rebel groups, and take those risks seriously when deciding what course of action to take. They must do their best to ensure that their intervention does not undermine the physical safety of the very people they are seeking to help.
Conclusion:
We have seen that the arms trade has an important role to play in ensuring that that right to security is protected. But we have also seen that the right to security generates duties to restrict the arms trade in significant ways. Weapons which pose a disproportionately large threat to noncombatants must not be traded, and weapons should not be sold to oppressive regimes. We also saw that while we may have good reasons to support rebel groups attempting to overthrow oppressive regimes, supporting such groups by arming them is, from a moral perspective, highly problematic.
people are unwilling to surrender responsibility for their security to their own state -, for a situation could arise in which that state is no longer able or willing to fulfil its obligations. This is not to deny that states are often dependent to some degree upon their allies for protection, but simply to point out that states are typically eager to avoid complete dependence. 11 Stohl and Grillot, op. cit., p. 22 12 The right to security may sometimes ground a right to weapons which is not conditional upon the ability to pay. If a legitimate state is unable to afford the weapons it needs to protect its citizens from unjust aggression, the international community may have a duty to provide weapons free of charge. It will have this duty if other ways of protecting the threatened individuals are unavailable or suboptimal. 13 An anonymous referee has suggested to me that arms markets can be criticized on the grounds that they enable firms to profit from injustice: arms companies profit when states purchase weapons from them in order to protect themselves against unjust aggressors. But notice that this is by no means a distinctive feature of arms markets.
Insurance markets also enable private firms to profit from injustice; as do markets in locks and intruder alarms:
firms operating in these markets profit because some people refuse to respect the property rights of others. Yet no one proposes abolishing these markets. This is because we believe that concerns about profiting from injustice are outweighed by countervailing considerations. My intuition is that the same is true for arms markets. In any case, my aim in this paper is to identify restrictions on the scope of arms markets which can be grounded in the same value which justifies arms transfers in the first place, namely, the value of security. 15 One complication arises from the fact that it might be permissible to possess and threaten to use certain weapons, even if it would be impermissible to follow through with that threat. This might well be true of nuclear weapons, which represent a special category of weapons. Given the spatially-and temporally-extended nature of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, and the severity of the harm they can inflict, the use of nuclear weapons is surely impermissible. But threatening to use nuclear weapons might be permissible precisely because such threats render the use of nuclear weapons less likely. Perhaps what we should say is that it is impermissible to sell (and thus enable others to use) weapons which it is impermissible to use unless one can be reasonably sure that the states to which
